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Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: ReExamining Appearance Regulation as an Invasion of
Privacy
CatherineL. Fisk*
It is only shallowpeople who do notjudge by appearances.
The true mystery of the world is the visible, not the
invisible.'
For several decades, civil libertarians on the bench, at the bar,
and in the academy have argued that privacy----whether as a
constitutional or statutory right or as protected by the common
law--should be understood as two separate concepts: freedom
from intrusion and protection for autonomy. As many have
observed, they are not unrelated: both are about limiting exertions
of government or institutional power for the sake of protecting the
boundary between the self and society and, ultimately, the vitality
of both. The relationship between privacy and autonomy is quite
plain in the workplace. We experience some workplace rules that
deny privacy or autonomy as invasions of the self. Perhaps
nowhere is the invasion more keenly felt than when an employer
demands, under penalty of forfeiting one's livelihood, that one
dress or alter one's physical appearance in a way that one finds
offensive, degrading, inappropriate, or alien.
Clothes and appearance are constitutive of how we see and feel
about ourselves and how we construct ourselves for the rest of the
world to see. Most people give careful thought to how they dress
as a part of defining who they are. We dress to establish an
identity and to fit in with some subculture while rejecting others.
(Green hair or brown? Dreads or straighteners? Make-up or none?
Brooks Brothers suits or T-shirts and jeans? Miniskirt and stilettos
or jeans and Birkenstocks?) Dressing does more than "fit[] the
dresser into one of the available, intelligible categories of people,"
Copyright 2006, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Thanks to Erwin
Chemerinsky, Mitu Gulati, and Erica Williamson for conversations that
deepened my thinking on this topic. Williamson's research for her own work on
this topic made my paper possible; her conversations with me made it fun.
Since they all disagree with some of what I say, I owe it to them to remind
readers that responsibility for errors and anathemas is my own. Thanks also to
the participants in the Louisiana Law Review symposium, "Examining Privacy
in the Workplace."
1. Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray 18 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998)
*

(1891).

1112

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

it is "performative in the sense that it does something in the world,
rather than just representing an 'interior.' 2 That is, people create
culture through their actions, including dress. Even those who
profess to attend little to their appearance make disregard of
appearance part of their definition of self; they see themselves as
free of vanity and superficiality, and they participate in the creation
of a subculture that rejects obvious attention to appearance.
Dress not only defines us, it affects how we feel on a daily
basis. People who like to dress up often say it makes them feel
more handsome, dignified, and powerful. People who loathe
dressing up say it makes them feel bound up, stilted, and
oppressed. Conventions of appearance for women and men, and
for racial, ethnic, and religious groups, express and observe
political and spiritual commitments that affect people at a deep
psychological level.
Anyone who thinks that appearance
regulation is trivial just is not thinking hard enough.3
In this essay, I argue that the legal framework of autonomy
privacy is a necessary supplement to the discrimination analysis
that has dominated legal thinking for thirty-five years of challenges
Appearance is an
to workplace appearance requirements.
important aspect of the way we perform our racial, gender, and
other identities; dress codes often discriminate on the basis of race,
religion, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, or disability,
and when they do they should be illegal. 5 Nevertheless, I believe it
is important to recognize that some appearance requirements
2. Duncan Kennedy, Sexy Dressing, Etc. 186 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993).
3. People do sometimes insist that dress codes are too trivial to be worthy
either of legal regulation or of much attention at all. Examples from judicial
opinions are collected and the assertion is debunked in Katharine T. Bartlett,
Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community
Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2541, 2556-59 (1994).
4. I am not the first to see the values of privacy as well as equality at stake
in legal protection for some degree of freedom of dress in the workplace. See
Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy,American Values, and the Law, 72 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 221, 251-53 (1996); Annabelle Lever, What's Wrong with that
Beard? Privacy and Equality in the Workplace: The Struggle Over Dress and
Grooming Codes (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
Nevertheless, as the citations infra in note 13 suggest, the dominant legal
analysis of workplace grooming requirements has been through the lens of
antidiscrimination rather than privacy.
5. On workplace discrimination and the performance of racial identity, see
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1259
(2000). A recent look at workplace identity performance with particular
attention to the challenges of analyzing appearance regulation through the
traditional framework of antidiscrimination law is Gowri Ramachandran,
Intersectionality as "Catch 22": Why Identity Performance Demands Are
NeitherHarmlessNor Reasonable,69 Alb.L. Rev. 299 (2005-2006).
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should be legally suspect even when they do not discriminate on
the basis of a protected status. On that basis I will argue for a
fundamental re-examination of the legal regulation of workplace
appearance codes. While the re-examination may be fundamental,
the permissibility of many appearance codes would not necessarily
change radically: some would be illegal, many would be legal. I
argue for a change of emphasis rather than a revolution in
outcomes.
A privacy analysis, in contrast to a discrimination analysis, is a
legal theory that is available to anyone who is significantly
oppressed by an unreasonable workplace dress code. Privacy
analysis may thus be more resistant to charges of special treatment
and the backlash that such charges can generate. 6 From the
employer's standpoint, privacy analysis allows more flexibility and
nuance in distinguishing appearance regulations that are legal from
those that are not. It might, for example, preserve the ability of an
employer to require some dress conventions, including some that
may reflect gender, religious, and other norms, while ruling out
others. A law firm might be able to require coats and ties for men
but not skirts for women, even though both are explicitly genderbased and neither is a bona fide occupational qualification, because
a court might conclude that the autonomy infringement might be
greater for the women and the justification for appealing to the
preferences of the employer or customers for men to look
professional is greater than for women to look sexy. A privacy
analysis would help courts distinguish between dress codes that
humiliate and those that do not, as well as help a court understand
that a dress code can be generally valid but cannot be enforced
against a particular employee who might find a particular dress
requirement exceptionally humiliating or offensive.
Wholly apart from the effects of a privacy analysis on the
outcome of litigation, I think it will also prompt a more thoughtful
analysis by firms of whether or how they should attempt to
formally regulate employee appearance and how to handle the
employee who objects. Employment law should attend not only to
how rules would be applied in litigation but also, perhaps even
most importantly, to how rules affect voluntary compliance. 7 A
6. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and
the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 523 (1980) (arguing
that an approach to rights that benefits all, rather than is perceived as special
treatment for some); Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination,Genetic Privacy:
Rethinking Employee Protectionsfor a Brave New Workplace, 96 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 1497 (2002).
7. One could argue, for example, that the major achievement of the
Americans With Disabilities Act is not reflected in the results of litigation,
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privacy analysis will prompt an employer to consider the strength
of its justification for its policy, the degree of humiliation it will
inflict on particular workers, and whether the harm is necessary to
achieve the benefit. A discrimination analysis, by contrast, invites
an employer to adopt even a silly appearance regulation (e.g.,
women must wear make-up and nail polish) if the employer can
convince itself that the regulation is not sex discrimination because
it equally burdens men or because only certain women will object.
Privacy analysis will thus better identify and accommodate the
employer's interest in the appearance of its workforce with the
interests of various employees in being free from humiliating
workplace requirements.
I. DRESS CODES, STATUS, AND POWER

A few months ago, I received a request for legal advice from
an employee of a school that had recently instituted a dress code
for all staff. The new rules required male staff to wear khaki
slacks and a collared shirt. The man, an electrician who often
worked outdoors and in un-air-conditioned spaces, said he could
not wear light-colored clothes because he had a physical condition
that caused him to perspire profusely. As he explained it, "If I
have to wear khaki pants, inside of an hour I'll look like I wet
myself. The students will laugh, and I'm just not willing to be
humiliated." I suggested that he get medical documentation of his
condition and ask his employer to make an exception to allow him
to wear dark-colored clothes. The man called me back a week
later and said that his employer refused to make an exception. I
thought about suggesting litigation except I could not find a legal
theory-his perspiration condition is probably not a disability
because excessive ,perspiring probably does not interfere with a
major life activity; firing him wasn't a breach of contract as he
was an at-will employee; it was hard to identify a public policy that
was offended by a khaki pants uniform; and the dress code was not
adopted or maintained for the purpose of intentionally inflicting
emotional distress. The man decided to resign rather than be
where plaintiffs lose overwhelmingly and where
narrowed by judicial interpretation, but through
changed employer assumptions about what they can
applicants and employees. See, e.g., Ruth Colker,

the law has been steadily
voluntary compliance that
and should do with disabled
Winning and Losing Under

the Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 239 (2001).

8. The Americans with Disabilities Act defines a disability as a "physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of [an] individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(A) (2000).
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humiliated by complying with the dress code or by having a
confrontation over refusing to comply.
I was at first stunned that the school district would reject what I
considered such a minor and reasonable request and would let a
long-term employee go because of it. But when I thought about it,
I realized that the school officials interpreted his request for an
exemption as a major challenge to their authority. And, as I
thought about why they thought so much was at stake over khaki
as opposed to black chino pants, I realized why this was not trivial
to them. If they made an exception for one employee, they must
have feared being inundated with requests for exceptions from
employees who did not want to buy a new wardrobe. They may
have worried that other employees would suspect favoritism as
From the
they wondered why he was treated differently.
employer's perspective, allowing one employee an alternative to
the dress code, even a dress code as arbitrary (but as conventional)
as one that required khaki-colored pants instead of dark-colored
ones, would risk not only the dress code but also the employer's
reputation for even-handedness. An employer that announces a
mandatory dress code and then cannot enforce it loses control over
the workplace in a way that it would perceive as quite serious. It
would upset the power structure. Soon, the school officials might
have feared, they would lose control over their "right" (or at least
their ability) to demand that employees dress professionally and
model appropriate behavior for students. Needless to say, schools
are acutely aware of the importance of maintaining discipline.
From my own grim memories of the barely controlled chaos in my
junior high, I'm not entirely unsympathetic to the general
sentiment, much as I thought the employer's desire to win this
particular power struggle was silly and misguided.
The experience of the man who could not wear khaki pants
also offers perspective on why the matter of dress codes ought not
be left to the negotiations of employer and employee. The very
definition of a dress code is one that must be applied to all
employees of a certain category. A khaki pants requirement is
probably unobjectionable to many, and thus I imagine it would be
rather difficult for the man I spoke with to persuade his co-workers
to join his cause. If they were going to stand up and fight over
working conditions, I suspect they would rather fight for a longer
lunch break or higher pay or a better student-teacher ratio. So the
man had no effective voice, his only "choice" was to quit. That is
the plight faced by any minority--a Sikh who wishes to wear a
turban, a woman who really detests make-up. Protecting the
minority from having to choose between a job and something
really important is what employment law is all about.
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Another window into the importance of power and autonomy,
as well as gender conformity, in workplace appearance regulation
is Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Company, in which Darlene
Jespersen, who had been a bartender in the sports bar at Harrah's
casino in Reno for many years, was fired after refusing to accept
the casino's new requirement that women wear make-up and nail
polish. 9 She had not worn make-up to work for years and Harrah's
had tolerated it. Moreover, what actually prompted the firing was
not that Jespersen came to work one day without make-up, but
rather that her supervisor provoked a show-down over Jespersen's
refusal to sign a statement promising to comply with the new
appearance policy. The policy, which Harrah's called a "Personal
Best Program," was adopted as part of a "Beverage Department
Image Transformation." Harrah's hired a make-up expert to give
each employee a make-over and then had a photographer take a
post-make-over photograph of each employee. Harrah's instructed
supervisors to use the photograph as an "appearance measurement
tool": that is, the supervisor was empowered and encouraged to
compare an employee to his or her photograph on a daily basis to
see whether he or she measured up. The appearance code required
females to wear specific types of make-up: foundation, blush,
mascara, and lipstick. Other requirements included "teased,
curled, or styled" hair and colored nail polish. Jespersen was fired
because she challenged the power of the company to change her
appearance. Although much of the writing on Jespersen has
focused on gender conformity, I think that power and humiliation
are as important to understanding the case as is gender. I imagine
that a number of women who have no objection to wearing makeup might have been offended by, and rebelled, against the intrusive
and demeaning nature of the Harrah's policy.
Because Title VII offered the only available claim, Jespersen's
lawyers had very good strategic reasons to play up the gender
identity issue and to play down the power struggle, but in doing so
they had to omit a crucial part of the story. Part of what Harrah's
was trying to do to Jespersen was to feminize and sexualize her,
but part of it was simply trying to control her. Put another way, if I
were in her situation I'd be offended by the "Personal Best"
requirement even though I personally have no objection to styling
my hair and wearing make-up. The Harrah's policy should be
illegal not only because or to the extent that it forces women to
9. 444 F.3d 1104, No. 03-15045 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). I rely on Devon
Carbado, Mitu Gulati & Gowri Ramachandran, The Jespersen Story: Makeup
and Women at Work, in Employment Discrimination Stories (Joel W. Friedman
ed. 2006) for the facts in this paragraph; all quotations are to their chapter.
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perform a particular version of a feminine gender identity, it
should be illegal even if every female Harrah's employee is
comfortable with a version of femininity that involves wearing
make-up and nail polish, simply because it removes their
autonomy to choose. Considering the case only through the lens of
sex discrimination ignores the concerns of all employees, male and
female, who find unnecessarily demeaning the use of the "Personal
Best" photograph as a measurement device, and the notion that
your supervisor is empowered to scrutinize the minute details of
your appearance on a daily basis, comparing you to a photograph,
and reprimanding you if on a particular day your supervisor
decides you just do not look enough like an idealized image of
yourself all done up.
Another perspective on the importance of power and
humiliation in appearance regulation is offered by the cases
involving people who are disciplined for covering their heads
according to the dictates of their religion. It is not hard to see that
a dress code that prohibits turbans, yarmulkes, or headscarves
disparately affects certain religions. But many people believe that
the discrimination should be permissible because people ought to
assimilate culturally. The skepticism about these claims often
comes from a notion that law should not require employers to
accommodate unconventional habits of dress regardless of an
employee's reason for choosing them. If the Air Force can
prohibit all people from wearing hats indoors or at night, why
should a Jew get a special exception? 10 A privacy analysis helps
us see why the Air Force's requirement really does harm a Jewish
man or a Sikh in a profound sense that is not captured simply by
thinking about when or whether people should be treated equally
or differently. Privacy refocuses our attention away from whether
Jews get a special exception from an appearance requirement that
many may find reasonable and toward the ways in which some
applications of appearance requirements that are, at most, annoying
or silly to some yet, to others, would be so offensive that they
would rather be discharged or quit rather than comply.
From the perspective of power and humiliation that privacy
analysis invites us to consider, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins might
read quite differently than it is usually interpreted." Ann Hopkins,
a candidate for partnership in the Price Waterhouse accounting
firm, was passed over for partnership and was advised that her
chances for reconsideration would improve if she wore make-up,
10. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986) (holding
that a Jewish officer was not entitled to an exemption from the no-hats rule).
11. 490 U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
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styled her hair, and wore jewelry. The Court held that Hopkins
was a victim of illegal sex stereotyping. 12 Of course it is a case
about discrimination. But the use of Ann Hopkins' appearance as
a reason to deny her partnership both reflects and exacerbates her
humiliating lack of status in the workplace as well as the
stereotyping that kept her from being perceived as successful.
Most people would probably encourage women and men at an
accounting firm to dress conventionally, which might include not
looking too butch or too feminine (in the case of women), or too
ethnic (in the case of racial or ethnic minorities) or too sloppy or
unprofessional (in the case of white men). Price Waterhouse
partners might say, in their own defense: "Look, there's an
appearance code here for everybody, and a man who regularly
failed to dress conventionally for work-by showing up without a
tie or in sweatpants or unshaven-would also not be welcomed
into the partnership either, so we're not discriminating. It's just
that somebody came out and said it to her."
But what you see reading between the lines of the decision is
that men who broke norms of appearance were probably quietly
reminded to spiff up a bit, whereas Ann Hopkins was not only
called on the carpet, but fired. The firm breached the norm that
appearance codes are not spelled out in detail and enforced by
adverse job action against professionals. The firm underscored
Hopkins' humiliating lack of status by acting like the headmistress
of my parochial high school who used to feel entitled to remark on
which girls wore their uniform skirts too short and who needed to
polish her saddle shoes. In short, appearance codes are about
power as well as about stereotyping, and I think we miss much of
the nuance when we focus only on one element.
Let me now move from the particularity of these four cases to a
general theoretical framework for considering workplace
appearance regulation. Most accounts of dress codes in legal
scholarship have focused on the ways that they enable both
employers and employees to do what economists refer to as
"screening" and "signaling" by enforcing social norms and
stereotypes about the appearance, attributes, and behavior of social
groups. Screening is the information economics term for devices
12. Id. at 250-51, 109 S. Ct. at 1791.
13. The literature discussing appearance requirements is voluminous. See,
e.g., Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discriminationas Sex Discrimination: An
Argument Against Neutrality, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 167 (2004); Kimberly A.
Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex
Discrimination, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 147 (2004); Robert Post, Prejudicial
Appearances: The Logic ofAmerican AntidiscriminationLaw, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1
(2000); Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual
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that people use to filter out the desirable from the undesirable in
the market. Signaling refers to the way that buyers and sellers in a
market reveal valuable but non-obvious information about
themselves. In the conventional account, dress is a way of
signaling certain qualities (professionalism, religious devotion,
attitudes toward sex) and dress regulation is a way that employers
use these signals both to screen potential employees for certain
traits and to enable customers or other potential trading partners to
screen out some business establishments in favor of others when
they seek a good or service in the marketplace.1 4 I do not disagree
that dress codes perform these functions. I want to suggest,
however, that appearance codes play other roles as well.
Sociologists, anthropologists, and high-school kids know that
appearance is a mark of status, or, more accurately, what
sociologist Erving Goffman called "social identity": the mix of
personal and social attributes through which every society
categorizes people. 15 As Goffman long ago observed, "first
appearances are likely to enable us to anticipate [a stranger's]
category and attributes," and we use our expectations based on
appearances to make quick judgments about people. 16 "We lean
on these anticipations we have, transforming them into normative
expectations, into righteously presented demands. 17 A supervisor
might think he is demanding adherence to certain norms of
appearance because the expected method of dress connotes a
higher or distinct status (as when a firm or a court demands that
men wear suits and ties). However, when an employee refuses to
accede to conventions of dress in a particular workplace, she
asserts her status as being beyond the power of the employer to
demand conformity.
Thus, when an employer insists upon conformity, the struggle
quickly becomes as much about maintaining discipline and
controlling deviance as it is about enforcing particular norms of
race, gender, or religion. Thus, although a mode of dress chosen,
even under the influence of social norms, can be a marker of an

Orientation:The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105
Yale L.J. 1 (1995); Bartlett, supra note 3, at 2553-55; Karl E. Klare,
Power/Dressing:Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 New Eng. L. Rev.
1395, 1426-8 (1992); Mary Wisner, Gender Specific Clothing Regulation: A
Study in Patriarchy,5 Harv. Women's L.J. 73, 74 (1982).
14. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 5.
15. See, e.g., Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of
Spoiled Identity (1963).
16. Id.at 2.
17. Id.
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individual's status, the same mode of dress explicitly compelled
becomes a marker of the employer's higher status and the
employee's subordination. In this analysis, we see that appearance
codes do more than screen and signal, they are a battleground of
social power.
To see why, consider some examples that have recently been in
the news. When David Stem, the commissioner of the NBA,
recently announced that professional basketball players should
dress like businessmen rather than like rappers when appearing in
public,1 8 and when George Steinbrenner made Johnn Damon cut
his hair as a condition of signing him to the Yankees, the heart of
the offense (if there is an offense) is not that the NBA and the
Yankees are discriminating on the basis of race or gender; the
offense (if there is one) is that they are trying to make players
project an image that some players don't want to project. There
may be, especially in the case of the NBA, an aspect of the dispute
that is about discrimination in the way that people perform racial
or gender identity, but there is a larger sense in which the disputes
are not about discrimination, they are about the power to project an
image.
In the case of the NBA players, one could argue that the chosen
attire of the players connotes some aspect of urban black
subculture, but it takes a bit of essentializing to argue that business
dress is somehow "white." Moreover, some of the attire that the
NBA sought to eradicate in public appearances is less "black" than
it is urban counter-cultural, as some young men of all races dress
that way. Many supporters and some critics of the NBA dress
18. The NBA dress code for off-court wear requires players to wear
"business or conservative attire" (collared shirts, closed-toe shoes, sport coats,
and no ostentatious jewelry) while traveling, on the bench during a game and not
in uniform, making official appearances, or conducting league business.
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, NBA Dress Code, http://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/NBAdresscode (last visited Mar. 24, 2006). All seem to agree that
the purpose of the code was to avoid players' appearance evoking "hip hop
culture," or what one newspaper columnist characterized as players "looking
like recruitment officers for the Bloods and the Crips." Frank Deford, Suiting
Up: NBA Dress Code Draws Criticismfrom Many Corners, Sports Illustrated,
Oct. 26, 2005, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com (quoting Phil
Muchnick of The New York Post). The NBA also recently has begun enforcing a
rule regulating players' on-court wear, requiring shorts to be one inch above the
knee, again for the same stated purpose: to avoid players looking too hip-hop.
See Selena Roberts, NBA Dress Code Confuses the Long and Short of It, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 6, 2005, at D 1.
19. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beard#
Sport (last visited Mar. 24, 2006) ("Under owner George Steinbrenner, the New
York Yankees baseball team has a strict dress code that forbids long hair and
facial hair below the lip.").
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code were uncomfortable saying that the problem was its effort to
make players look less "black" because it says that professional
dress is "white." To me, what is at least as important as whether
the appearance code is racial stereotyping is that it is an effort to
control how the players express themselves through their dress.
The NBA is big business for big business. NBA players, when
they are not entertaining business people watching a game from
their luxury boxes, are often touted as role models for kids; they
promote reading, hard work, etc. Neither role is consistent, at least
in the eyes of some NBA officials, with looking like rebellious
teens because the image connoted by certain clothing is not
"blackness," it is (to some people's view) criminality and a lack of
respect for education. So the NBA insisted that the players project
a conventional business image rather than an urban renegade
subculture image. What bothers me is not the racial connotations
of the dress code but that it puts the NBA in the role of a
judgmental parent ("You're not going out of the house dressed like
that") and the players in the position of recalcitrant teens.
Damon's hair is an even better case for re-considering dress
codes as autonomy infringements rather than status discrimination.
Damon's long hair and beard may have been flamboyant and
unconventional, but it wasn't a marker of a protected status (people
said it made him look like Jesus, but no one claims that
Steinbrenner was discriminating against Christians in requiring
short hair and no beards).2 ° It had become a marker of his status as
a marquee player, as someone so recognizable that he could be
easily spotted even by those
21 ignorant about baseball when he
played himself in a movie.
Insisting on adherence to the dress
code says to the world, "you're my player now and I can make you
wear your hair in any way I please." That professional athletes are
fantastically well-compensated does not make the regulation of
their appearance any less an infringement on their autonomy; it
only means that they are paid well for enduring it.
Finally, to see why the appearance regulations sought to be
imposed on these athletes was as much about power as about
discrimination, consider the circumstances in which an employer
feels empowered to articulate and enforce an explicit dress code.
Dress codes are usually defended by reference to the employer's
20. Bob Hohler, Hair'sJohnny: Damon Shocks His Appearance Sets Him
Apart, The Boston Globe, Feb. 26, 2004, at C6 ("Heads turned as Damon, fully
bearded, with his brown hair flowing to his shoulders, submitted one of the best
impersonations of Jesus of Nazareth this side of "The Passion of the Christ.").
21. Damon's distinctive appearance helped to make him a minor character
in the film about the Boston Red Sox World Series winning season, FeverPitch.
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"right" or "power" to present the corporate image of its choice. As
a professor of consumer behavior put it, "to have somebody really
out of context destro2is the illusion" that a company chooses to
create for its public.
But many firms either do not explicitly
articulate a dress code or do not enforce it because to do so would
be contrary to the norms of the occupation or the firm. Most
universities, for example, do not maintain dress codes for faculty.
Thus, high status jobs are more likely to leave dress codes quite
vague ("business attire" or "casual Fridays") and not to call
nonconformists onto the carpet in an explicit way.
When the norms of appearance autonomy are violated in high
status jobs, the offense cannot be captured solely through the
rubric of unequal treatment. If the dean of my law school came to
my office to ask me to dress more formally to teach, the offense
would not be sex discrimination, even if business clothes are
different for men and women (unless of course she confronted only
women and allowed men to dress casually). The offense to me
would be the dean asserting the power to tell me what image I am
to project. Though I never wear jeans to teach, my immediate
instinct would be to wear nothing but jeans so long as the dean
insisted on the power to tell me otherwise. The fact that most law
school deans would not dream of telling faculty how to dress, even
if some probably wish that some faculty dressed more formally,
reveals the fundamental significance of power and humiliation in
workplace dress codes. They realize they do not have the power to
control that aspect of law professors' behavior, and they have no
desire to risk their own dignity by treading on that aspect of status.
Employers of high-status employees rarely attempt to assert the
power to request employees project a certain image because they
risk losing power rather than gaining it in the confrontation. As
noted above, the transgression of the unspoken rule that dress
codes remain largely unspoken is one of the appalling features of
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse.
There is a world of difference in choosing to wear something
and being forced to wear it. Choosing to wear something is to
experience the power to present a self to the world, even if the
choice is heavily constrained by social forces and reflects only a
decision to blend in by wearing something you would never
otherwise choose to wear. (Why would men choose to wear a
piece of colored silk knotted tightly around their necks except that
it is conventional and in our culture connotes professionalism,
elegance, and respect for tradition?) Being told you will be fired
22. Kara Jesella, Beauty Bullies, N.Y. Times Style Magazine, Spring 2006,
at 130 (quoting Michael Solomon of Auburn University).
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unless you attend a business meeting on Wall Street wearing a pinstriped suit has a whole different connotation than reluctantly
choosing to wear one because you know you will raise eyebrows if
you do not. Elite workplaces do not bother with formal dress
codes except at the most general level (Is there a casual Friday?
Do men wear ties? Do women wear dresses or suits?). That is
because power operates quite differently at that status level.
It is important to understand that context is everything in
thinking about whether and when dress codes humiliate. When
police forces and railroads sought to introduce uniforms in midnineteenth century America, their efforts were met with derision
and resistance by workers who considered uniforms "degrading in
a democratic society" and appropriate only for "liveried servants"
not "free Americans." 23 Today, of course, most people see nothing
degrading about requiring police officers to wear uniforms. Not
every dress code is an effort to induce conformity for the sake of
conformity, or to assert power. The requirement that employees
wear costumes is sometimes about setting a mood (as with a
symphony orchestra) or playing a role (as in Disneyland) and it is
sometimes about making employees easily identifiable and
distinguishable from others (as in the case of police, soldiers,
hospital employees, and flight attendants). And there may be
circumstances in which minute attention to the smallest aspects of
personal appearance is not demeaning because appearance is so
integral to the job (as in the case of actors and fashion models).
Appearance requirements, even when they are gendered or racial,
in these circumstances connote an entirely different power
dynamic than do appearance requirements enforced against
athletes or bartenders. The reason has something to do with the
tradition of respect for military and police uniforms, and something
to do with the widespread recognition that conventions of dress are
at the core rather than the periphery of some jobs (such as playing
Snow White for a crowd of children at Disneyland).
There are plenty of cases on the margins, however. Are
employees who work at office jobs within the fashion industry fair
game for unabashed supervisory demands as to their appearance?
A recent article in the style supplement to The New York Times
Magazine argues they are not, characterizing as "beauty bullies"
supervisors "who demand that their staff look a certain way and
23. Finkin, supra note 4, at 252 (quoting Walter Licht, Working for the
Railroad: The Organization of Work in the Nineteenth Century 271 (1983), and
David Montgomery, Citizen Worker: The Experience of Workers in the United
States with Democracy and the Free Market During the Nineteenth Century 67

(1993)).
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aren't shy about saying so." 24 Even if you work in an industry that
sells beauty, when a publicist says to a subordinate that she needs
to dye her hair, pluck her eyebrows, or get a pedicure, the demands
can be interpreted not as creating a corporate image but as
humiliating a young subordinate. Can any firm that sells beauty
(however defined) insist that all its employees conform to the
firm's definition of beauty? If so, how should the law decide
which industries or firms have "appearance" sufficiently at their
core to justify intrusive appearance regulation? Why casinos,
fashion publishers, and beauty shops but not airlines?
The
necessity and the cultural context make some uniforms and
appearance requirements a source of fun or pride and others
humiliating.
Even when an appearance requirement is generally
unobjectionable from the standpoint of individual freedom,
however, there may be applications of the uniform requirement
that are really about power and humiliation. Antidiscrimination
law has traditionally focused on requiring the same treatment of all
or different treatment for some, and has had a notoriously difficult
time distinguishing when justice is better served by a model of
equality or one of difference. 25 (Think of the long controversy
over pregnancy discrimination,
religious
and disability
accommodation, and affirmative action.)
When it comes to
appearance requirements, one can see that sometimes equal
treatment is humiliating and sometimes different treatment is.
When the Citadel proposed to force its first female cadet to
shave her head like the male cadets, all saw that equal treatment
was a way to humiliate a woman whom it believed did not belong
in a male institution by forcing her to look like a man to the point
of ridicule. 26 A bank's rule that women had to wear uniforms
24. Jesella, supra note 22, at 130 ("The stories are legion: the beauty
executive who fired a junior staffer who refused to get Japanese hair
straightening; the male editor in chief who explicitly forbade his female
employees to wear makeup (which is nothing compared with the famously
soignie editrix who insists that prospective hires include Polaroids along with
their resumes).").
25. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Antidiscriminationand Accommodation, 115
Harv. L. Rev. 642 (2001); Samuel Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination,"
Accommodation, and the Politicsof (Disability)Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825
(2003).
26. See Bartlett, supra note 3, at 2571-72 & n.146 ("Ironically, the ritual of
scalp shaving in the military-school context is to humiliate and to provide a
basis for group bonding. When applied to the only woman in an otherwise allmale environment, however, there should be little doubt that the effect is to set
apart the female for whom a bald head means something quite different than for

men.").
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27
while men did not was properly seen to be humiliating to women;
conversely, if a police department required men but not women to
wear uniforms, again, most would see that, women would be
humiliated. The Air Force's refusal to treat an Orthodox Jew
differently-prohibiting him from wearing a kepah because head
coverings are not worn indoors or at night-was humiliating
because it signified that the Air Force has the power to dictate rules
that deny religious expression.28 What helps us distinguish
humiliation and dignity in equal treatment and different treatment
is attention to the ways that controlling dress is an exercise of
power.
The focus on screening or signaling which dominate
antidiscrimination analysis trains our attention on whether it is
acceptable for the employer generally, in the name of signaling
professionalism for example, to expect that men dress
conventionally, or whether it is acceptable for employers to screen
employees by employing only those who adhere to widelyaccepted societal norms, such as not exposing tattoos. 29 Both of
these focuses make appearance codes seem trivial. A privacy
analysis with its attention to coercion and humiliation, by contrast,
reminds us of why appearances matter and helps us identify the
situations in which equality should be required and when
difference should be required. Privacy doctrine alerts us to the
exercise of power and to the question whether an exercise of power
is really offensive to freedom and when it is justified by some
overwhelming need.

II. PRIVACY AS AUTONOMY

At its origins, the invasion of privacy tort was like the tort of
outrage (now known as intentional infliction of emotional distress)
in its emphasis on humiliation.
Like intentional infliction of
27. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1989).
28. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986) (holding
that a Jewish officer did not have a first amendment right to wear a yarmulke in
contravention of Air Force regulation prohibiting the wearing of headgear
indoors).
29. See Brandy Dela Vega, Tattoos in Business: OK or Taboo?, Reno
Gazette-Journal, Mar. 5, 2006, at 1E.
30. See William L. Prosser, Law of Torts 802 (West Publishing Co. 4th ed.
1971) (early advocates for a right of privacy emphasized need to protect "private
individuals against the unjustifiable infliction of mental pain and distress");
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 Harv. L. Rev.
193, 195 (1890) (arguing that common law protects "thoughts, emotions, and
sensations" as well as physical integrity and property, and therefore that a right
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emotional distress, privacy focuses on how some behaviors assault
a person's autonomy by affronting their dignity or psyche, just as
other torts, such as assault or battery, injure by invading autonomy
through threats or actual physical touching. Privacy was seen as a
tort doctrine that would protect the individual against the harms of
abuses of power in society.
In the years since invasion of privacy was first regarded as
being a legal wrong, the protections for privacy have spread
through tort law, constitutional law, and statutes. Different states
define a right to workplace privacy in different ways, and protect it
under a variety of doctrines, including statutes, the various
permutations of the privacy tort recognized by the Restatement of
Torts, a public policy claim, a constitutional claim (for public
sector employees and, even in private employment in California,
where the constitutional right of privacy does not have a state
action requirement), 3 ' "the covenant of good faith and fair dealing"
(in Alaska), 32 and, in cases of extremely offensive policies like
strip searches, the intentional infliction of emotional distress.33
Most jurisdictions recognize that a right of privacy, however
protected, extends both to what employees do at work (for
example, through audio or video recording of the workspace) and
what they do away from work (for example, social and political
activities or affiliations).
Whatever the source of the privacy right, under most states'
laws, the analysis boils down to the same four questions. First,
how serious or offensive is the invasion of employee privacy?
Second, does the employee have a subjectively genuine and
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, or expectation of
freedom from employer control? Third, does the employer have a
legitimate reason for its policy and, if so, how compelling is its

of privacy is a logical outgrowth of legal protections against defamation, assault,
and theft of intellectual property).
31. See Cal. Const. art. I, § 1; Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr.
2d 77 (Cal. App. 1st 1991). The California constitutional right of privacy was
added by ballot initiative in 1972, and the ballot arguments favoring it explicitly
mentioned employment as an area needing legal regulation to protect employee
privacy. Soroka, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83.
32. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1223-24
(Alaska 1992).
33. The legal protections for a right of privacy in employment are
comprehensively discussed in Matthew W. Finkin, Privacy in Employment Law
(2d ed. 2003). The welter of difficult privacy interests protected by current law
are discussed in Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev.
477 (2006).
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reason? Fourth, could the employer serve its legitimate interest
through some other policy that is less invasive?
I recognize that in most states privacy rights in the workplace,
if they exist at all, are quite narrow and weak. The doctrinal
discussion that follows is not intended as an argument for why
existing doctrine already solidly supports a right of employee
autonomy in matters of appearance. Existing doctrine probably
does not support such a right in the majority of states. Rather, the
discussion that follows is intended as a jurisprudential exercise to
explore how, if a robust right of privacy did exist in a state, such a
right could be extended to cover the autonomy right of employees
to choose their appearance absent some legitimate employer
justification. In such a world, analysis of dress codes through a
privacy rubric would look something like this.
First, one would consider how significantly the dress code
restricts an employee's freedom of choice in dress. This is the
equivalent of asking how seriously or offensively a workplace rule
intrudes upon an employee's privacy. A general requirement of
neat grooming is generally not a serious intrusion. The Jespersen
regime of a large amount of make-up, nail polish of specified
colors, and "teased, curled, or styled" hair is a substantial
intrusion. 34 The system that requires the supervisor to compare an
employee's daily appearance to a photograph taken after a makeup artist and hair stylist "made over" the employee and,
presumably, to berate the employee if her looks on a particular day
diverge too far from the photo is quite intrusive. A requirement of
wearing a uniform, particularly the requirements regarding the
minute details of the dress uniform imposed by the armed forces, is
a substantial intrusion. A general requirement of wearing a
conservative suit and tie is a less significant intrusion in most
cases, although a particular employee from some non-Western
culture might find it very intrusive. Under a privacy analysis, as
under current antidiscrimination law, the inquiry into the
intrusiveness of the regulation will be partly subjective (does the
employee credibly establish how the makeup rule humiliates her?)
and partly objective (would a reasonable person in the employee's
situation find wearing makeup to be offensive?).
34. The "Personal Best" grooming policy was exceptionally detailed. It
specified that "[h]air must be teased, curled, or styled every day you work. Hair
must be worn down at all times, no exceptions." Further, it dictated particular
quantity, types and colors for make-up: "Make-up (foundation/concealer and/or
face powder, as well as blush and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in
complimentary colors." "Lip color must be worn at all times." Jespersen v.
Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107, No. 03-15045 slip op. at 4123
(9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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The second step asks about the employee's expectation of
freedom from intrusion. This has both a subjective and an
objective element. The subjective element should examine the
characteristics of the employee to determine whether the
appearance code violates some aspect of the employee autonomy
that the employee regards as crucial. A Sikh man or a Muslim or
Orthodox Jewish woman would regard uncovering their hair as a
major intrusion, while someone who just likes to wear a hat might
or might not. On the other hand, the claim does not have to be
religious in order to survive: thus, there would be no distinction
(unlike under current law) between a woman who wore a headscarf
35
for religious reasons and one who wears one for cultural reasons.
Does the employee refuse to wear make-up because of a consistent
or profound objection to it, or does she just feel too lazy to put it
on one day? Skeptics worry that emphasis on subjective claims of
harm would empower an employee to claim, for instance, that
wearing a baseball hat is as important to him as wearing a
headscarf is to a Muslim woman.
I think that fear is overblown. To raise a triable issue of fact
(or to convince a jury) on the existence of a sincere but subjective
claim of injury, the employee would have to offer evidence that he
always wears a hat and that the baseball hat occupies a place in his
life that religious head coverings do in the lives of the devout.
There may be some frivolous cases, just as people occasionally
succeed in making frivolous claims as to whether their religion
requires particular dress or practice. But I am not so doubtful of
the ability of judges and jurors to sort these cases out that I am
willing to sacrifice the autonomy rights of the nonreligious to dress
in the way that is important to them.
A different fear about using the right of privacy to challenge
workplace appearance codes focuses on the ease with which
employers can eliminate expectations of privacy simply by
announcing their intention to intrude upon privacy regularly.
Could Harrah's, for example, defeat Darlene Jespersen's privacy
claim by asserting that in the casino industry looks matter and that
employees who work in the field should expect minute attention to
their looks, just as they should expect to be videotaped every
35. See Isaacs v. Bd. of Educ., 40 F. Supp. 2d 335 (D.Md. 1999) (rejecting
the claim of a school girl who sought to wear a headwrap of the Caribbean style
because her headwrap was neither political speech nor religious exercise);
United States v. Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990) (teacher has no right
to wear headscarf); Justice Backs Muslim Girl in Headscarf Case, Financial
Times (London, England), Mar. 31, 2004, at 7 (U.S. Department of Justice
intervened in a suit brought by a Muslim sixth-grader and her family challenging
ban on headscarves).
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moment they are on the gambling floor in order to protect the
safety and honesty of the operation? Here, again, thoughtful
analysts of the right of privacy recognize that the law needs to be
reasonable. If an employer can defeat any right of privacy simply
by announcing its intention to allow no privacy, the right is
eviscerated, just as the constitutional right of privacy could in
theory be eviscerated by the government's announcement that
henceforward we'll all have government-monitored cameras in
every room of our homes. The expectation of privacy, most agree,
is more than a function of whatever the powers-that-be will
vouchsafe to us at any given moment.
An additional check on frivolous claims is offered by the
requirement that an expectation of privacy be objectively, as well
as subjectively, reasonable. The objective element would examine
the characteristics of the workplace to try to grasp the connotations
of an appearance requirement to assess whether the reasonable
person would find particular appearance regulation an offensive
invasion of autonomy. Regulation of hair length in the military has
different connotations than it does if you work at the Gap. A buzz
cut means something different for men than it does for women, and
would objectively be regarded as humiliating for a woman but not
for a man.
Third, established law asks whether the employer has a good
reason for its requirement. Here, privacy analysis has a real
advantage over discrimination analysis because it will enable a
more thoughtful (or maybe just a more middle-of-the-road)
approach to whether tradition or employer or customer preferences
justify a dress code. If the offense of the dress code is generally
small, then tradition is probably sufficient.
Thus, if it is
conventional to wear a suit and tie on Wall Street, there is nothing
wrong with requiring men to wear suits and ties unless the man has
some strenuous and good objection (such as his religion). The
armed forces might be able to enforce all of their uniform
requirements, including the picayune ones about which ribbon is
worn on which part of which coat at which time of day, but not,
against an Orthodox Jew, the requirement that men have their
heads uncovered indoors or at night.
The strength of the employer's justification for its appearance
requirements mirrors the function of the bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) (in the case of expressly discriminatory dress
requirements) or the business necessity defense (in the case of
dress requirements that are neutral on their face but have a
disparate impact). Take the example of safety. A requirement that
firefighters or airline crew refrain from wearing beards might be
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justifiable if it can be proven that in fact a beard prevents the
proper fit of an oxygen mask.36
Fourth, and finally, privacy analysis asks about whether the
employer's asserted reasons for the appearance requirement could
be achieved in some less intrusive manner. If a uniform is
necessary in order to distinguish employees from members of the
public, as in the case of airline flight attendants, is it really
necessary that the uniform be sexy? Would it have to require
women to wear skirts? If the symbolism of minute attention to
every detail of military uniforms is necessary to enable people to
read each other's rank at a glance, it may be permissible to regulate
to the nth degree where people wear ribbons on their uniform. But
that same attention to detail may not necessitate that men refrain
from wearing head coverings. If that requirement is supported
only by tradition, perhaps that requirement can give way to a
particular employee's strong religious beliefs without jeopardizing
the uniform requirement in all its other minute details.
An important question to consider is the allocation of the
burden of proving the various elements. I propose a divided
burden of proof, basing the division on who is more likely to have
access to the necessary evidence. Some elements should surely be
on the employee--the intrusiveness of the regulation, the sincerity
and reasonableness of the employee's belief that particular dress
habits are expressive of her identity and that the employer's
contrary rule compromises her autonomy in a significant way.
Some elements should probably be upon the employer, such as the
justification for the appearance requirement and the inability to
achieve its goals through a less intrusive policy or the inability to
make an exception for a particular employee. For example, even if
one were prepared to uphold the right of the Air Force to prohibit
headgear indoors under most circumstances, exactly what was so
compelling about the Air Force's requirement that men refrain
from wearing head coverings that it could not make an exception
for a rabbi? Would it really cause every Air Force officer to insist
on wearing their uniform hats, or baseball hats?
A shifting burdens privacy analysis could operate rather like
the shifting burdens analysis used in individual disparate treatment
cases. We might start with a presumption that dress codes or
appearance regulations that accord with customary norms of dress
and appearance within the dominant society are legal. Dress codes
or appearance regulations that deviate significantly from dominant
norms (such as requiring all women to wear short skirts and large
36. See, e.g., Potter v. District of Columbia, 382 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C.
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quantities of makeup, requiring all employees to wear sexually
provocative clothing, or requiring a uniform outside the segments
of society where uniforms are conventional) would be
presumptively an infringement of privacy. The presumption of
legality could be rebutted by a showing of an infringement of
autonomy and the presumption of illegality could be rebutted by
proof of a justification.
The strength of the justification or the degree of humiliation
that would be necessary to prove the dress code to be either legal
or illegal could thus depend on the circumstances. A relatively
weak employer preference for a generally inoffensive dress code
(say, that all table staff in a restaurant wear black slacks and a
white long-sleeve button-front shirt) would survive a challenge
from an employee who could not show a good reason for rejecting
it. But it would take a stronger employer justification to defend a
more outrageous dress code even against a moderate employee
objection. The advantage of a system of presumptions is that it
would create relatively clear default rules for employers wishing to
maintain appearance requirements while nevertheless requiring a
justification when the seriousness of the harm of the dress code
was shown by an employee.
The foregoing is just a sketch of how privacy law might
approach workplace appearance requirements. It suggests that
privacy analysis not only enables sincere and compelling claims of
autonomy to be respected, not just those that can be identified as
linked to a particular protected class, but also allows employers to
enforce dress codes in many cases upon a showing of necessity.
Unlike current law, it would allow racial appearance requirements
if the employer can prove they are really necessary (whereas
currently there is no BFOQ for race), while doing a better job than
the existing law which forces employers to justify arbitrary and
oppressive appearance requirements even when they do not
discriminate. Let me now turn to a more systematic comparison of
a privacy analysis and the dominant antidiscrimination framework,
and also consider some likely objections to my proposal.

1I.

HUMILIATION VERSUS DISCRIMINATION

A. DiscriminationAnalysis ofDress Codes andIts Problems
For the forty years that Title VII has been in force, legal
analysis of workplace dress codes has focused almost exclusively
on whether they discriminate on the basis of status, gender, race, or
religion. Commentators and history have not been kind to the
efforts of courts to decide which social norms of dress are legal
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and which are not.37 All of the various approaches that courts have
used are either too deferential to employer preference or unable to
persuade those who think that some employer-mandated gender
difference in attire ought to be legally permissible. Under
antidiscrimination law, a court that believes a workplace dress
code is acceptable must either conclude that it does not
discriminate or that the discrimination is justified as a BFOQ based
on the preferences of the employer or the customers. Neither
conclusion seems very appealing to many courts.
First, the per se approach, which held that any employermandated gender difference in appearance was sex discrimination,
risks undermining the limits on the BFOQ defense by allowing
stereotypes or employer or customer preference to be enough to
justify discrimination. 38 Most commentators, and many courts
outside the appearance regulation area, insist that the BFOQ
defense should be very narrowly circumscribed so that firms will
not be allowed to rely on hidden bias, stereotype, or discriminatory
customer attitudes to justify discriminatory practices. Thus, in
Johnson Controls, the leading case on the sex-based BFOQ, the
Supreme Court rejected the contention that the risk of birth defects
caused by lead exposure sufficed to justify a rule that prohibited
fertile women from working in battery production. 39 The Court
insisted that the BFOQ defense be construed "narrowly" and be
limited to circumstances in which there was evidence that
employees of one sex could
not do the job as efficiently as
g°
employees of the other sex.
Commentators have remarked on the inescapable role of
community norms in deciding when adherence to certain endered
appearance requirements is the "essence" of a business.
In an
early case involving an older business model of Southwest
Airlines, in which Southwest advertised itself as the "Love
Airline" and marketed the sex appeal of its flight attendants to its
target clientele of male business travelers, the court rejected the
37. See sources cited supra note 13.
38. I owe this typology of different approaches to dress codes to Erica
Williamson, whose Note sorted out the cases and the dominant critiques of
them. Erica Williamson, Note, Moving Past Hippies and Harassment: A
Historical Approach to Sex, Appearance, and the Workplace, 56 Duke L.J.
(forthcoming 2006).
39. Int'l Union United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S.
187, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
40. Id. at 206, 111 S. Ct. at 1207 (BFOQ requires that the "employer must

direct its concerns about a woman's ability to perform her job safely and
efficiently to those aspects of the woman's job-related activities that fall within
the 'essence' of the particular business.").
41.

See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 3.
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contention that the essence of Southwest's business was selling sex
appeal plus safe air travel, and insisted instead that safe air travel
was the business.42 Who is to say whether the essence of Hooters'
business is selling food or selling sex appeal plus food? Could a
law firm legally say that the essence of the business is to satisfy
client preferences, including, as a lawyer in my early career once
described, a client's preference for an associate who was a
"goyisha girl with big charlies"?
If a court believes a
discriminatory dress code can be upheld as a BFOQ, and no court
has in the history of Title VII, it is a bit difficult to understand why
the preference of an employer or its customers for women in makeup or men in neckties should be honored whereas the preference of
an employer or its customers for only 4young and handsome
employees, or only unmarried employees, 4 or only non-Muslim
employees, or for only men and infertile women to work in battery
production facilities, should not be honored. The alternative to
allowing biased employer or customer preferences to govern is to
prohibit any appearance regulation that was not entirely
androgynous.
An alternative to the per se rule, with its inevitable struggles
over the scope of the BFOQ, is the mutability analysis, which held
that appearance codes are permissible because they do not
discriminate based on immutable characteristics such as race, sex,
or national origin. The mutability analysis is vulnerable to the
argument that Title VII prohibits discrimination on mutable traits
(religion) and trait-plus discrimination even when the "plus" is
entirely mutable (employer discrimination against women who are
married4 5 or who have small children4 6 is illegal, though both of

those traits are mutable). The variation on the mutability rule, that
42. In both Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex.
1981) (which involved the "Love Airline" marketing campaign), and Diaz v.
PanAmerican World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (in which Pan
Am justified its refusal to hire male flight attendants with expert psychiatric
testimony that the special psychological needs of passengers in an airplane are
better attended to by females), the courts rejected the contention that the essence
of the airline business is selling comfort or sex appeal rather than merely safe air
travel.
43. See, e.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 97 S. Ct.
2464 (1977) (describing the range of litigation challenging sex discrimination by
airlines in hiring flight attendants); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d
1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (declaring the airlines' no-marriage rule for female flight
attendants unlawful).
44. Johnson Controls,499 U.S. at 187, 111 S. Ct. at 1196.
45. Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198.
46. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 91 S. Ct. 496 (1971)
(per curiam).
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Title VII prohibits discrimination only based on immutable traits
plus fundamental rights (which would protect religion and family
status) still is vulnerable: an employer that hired men only if they
can play tennis without applying the same requirement to women,
or that refused to hire women but not men who bowl, would
violate Title VII even though playing tennis and bowling are not
generally regarded as fundamental rights.47
A third approach to discriminatory dress codes is the one
employed most recently in Jespersen: the unequal burdens
analysis, which allows appearance codes that equally burden men
and women or other comparison groups.48 Its principal flaw is that
it invites silly and utterly subjective comparisons: Is wearing a
necktie more or less burdensome than wearing panty hose? Does it
matter whether it is winter or summer? Is shaving one's face more
or less burdensome than applying make-up and nail polish? What
should a court do about the claim of a particular man who
especially loathes a discriminatory appearance requirement (like
shaving or putting on make-up) if most say they don't particularly
mind it?
The failures of the unequal burdens analysis are prominently
displayed in the recent en banc decision in Jesperson. The
majority held that Jesperson had failed to raise a triable issue of
fact about whether Harrah's sex-specific, daily requirement of
elaborate makeup, hairstyling, and nail polish burdened women
more than the requirement that men wear short hair, shave, and
trim their fingernails because she had not offered evidence of the
time and expense women, as opposed to men, spent in complying
with the policy.49

As Judge Kozinski pointed out in dissent,

anyone with ordinary experience in life knows that women would
spend much more time and money applying the large quantity of
makeup, styling their hair, and polishing their nails than men
would in simply combing their hair and trimming their nails.5 0 Of
47. See id. at 543, 91 S. Ct. 498 (holding that discrimination on the basis of
sex plus another trait is illegal). While some commentators have noted that
some of the cases challenging appearance codes have remarked that sex-plus
discrimination is unlawful only if the trait is immutable or a fundamental right,
see Yuracko, supra note 13, at 205 & nn.145-47 (collecting citations), there are
other cases, including Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct.
1775 (1989), in which courts have found trait discrimination to be illegal even
when the sex-plus trait is not immutable. I have a hard time believing that a
court would uphold an employment rule prohibiting women but not men from
bowling if any employer were silly enough to enforce one.
48. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, No. 03-15045
slip op. (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
49. Id. slip op. at 4129.
50. Id. slip op. at 4141 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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course, in future cases courts will be treated to expert witnesses
(think of the job opportunities in forensic cosmetology). Then,
courts will have to decide what burdens count besides time and
money (which form of hot, sweaty discomfort is worse: wearing
pantyhose or a necktie on a muggy August day in Washington,
D.C.?).
The conceptual failings of the dominant forms of
discrimination analysis as applied to dress codes go deeper than the
overbreadth or under-inclusiveness of the existing rules. The
notion that gendered or ethnic dress codes are illegal only because
they discriminate is, in some cases, artificial. It fails to capture
many of the reasons why employees object to particular
appearance regulation. Men in the 1960s did not grow their hair
long in order to look like women, and the offense of making them
cut their hair was not that they were not allowed to wear their hair
like women but that they were not allowed to express the nongendered message that long hair connoted. Men who wear long
hair are not necessarily (or even usually) gender-bending: long
hair symbolizes other things--in the 1960s it signified rebellion
against power, convention, and the older generation; it can signifA
authentic Native American identity; it can signify earthiness.
The make-up requirement to which Darlene Jespersen objected is
more obviously a case of gender discrimination in that wearing
make-up is clearly about feminine sexuality. But even women
who are happy to wear make-up when they choose might be
offended by being forced to wear a certain quantity and to have
their compliance checked.
The essentialism of discrimination analysis is its reliance on
the idea that certain appearance conventions are "white" or "black"
or "male" or whatever. Some whites and some blacks can wear
their hair in an Afro, some of both races cannot. When a court
rejected the claim of a black flight attendant who was fired for
wearing her hair in cornrows by pointing out that the hair style was
not "black" because Bo Derek popularized braids in the movie
"10," the court refused to acknowledge that for that flight
attendant, wearing her hair in cornrows was an important
51. I am reminded of the Crosby, Stills, Nash (and Young) song, Almost
Cut My Hair, which celebrates long hair as a badge of independence:
Almost cut my hair
It happened just the other day
It's gettin' kind of long
I coulda said it wasn't in my way
But I didn't and I wonder why
I feel like letting my freak flag fly.
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expression of her racial identity, whereas the same hairstyle
on a
52
white woman may connote something entirely different.
B. The Advantages of PrivacyAnalysis
There are several advantages, both practical and doctrinal, for
re-examining workplace dress codes in terms of autonomy-privacy.
The advantages fall into two categories. First, privacy analysis
does a better job than discrimination analysis of balancing
competing employer and employee interests by calibrating the
strength of the employer interest in regulating appearance to the
degree of autonomy infringement that regulation causes. Second,
privacy is a right that all enjoy, thus the legal protection is
extended to every person because of their individuality, not only to
members of those groups who are protected by antidiscrimination
law and who can convince a court that a dress code treats some
groups better than others.
1. CalibrationandNuance
A legal strategy that focused on discrimination was always
vulnerable to the fears of the extreme argument. To take the
argument to its logical conclusion, skeptics routinely claimed,
would prohibit employers from requiring employees to adhere to
conventions for professional dress (men must wear suits and ties;
women can and sometimes must wear suits but not neckties). It
would, skeptics insisted, either compel an employer to employ a
drag queen in a customer service position or to require all
employees to dress entirely androgynously so that women would
be prohibited from wearing long hair, make-up, dresses, or high
heels if they choose. Both contentions are often taken as
argument-stoppers. Once you concede, as Katharine Bartlett did
and I do, that Title VII should allow some dress codes that reflect
community norms while rejecting others, you have a tough time
deciding which norms the law can and should change or reject and
which it should accept.53 Privacy analysis helps, for it reminds
courts and employers that all of us have to conform to some norms
of appearance some of the time, but that no one should be required
to conform to every norm all the time regardless of the harm
inflicted or the strength of the justification.
52. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Paulette M. Caldwell, A HairPiece: Perspectiveson the Intersection of Race
and Gender, 1991 Duke L. J. 365, 365-66 (1991).
53. Bartlett, supra note 3.
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The doctrinal structure of privacy law invites flexibility and
nuance in the examination of the degree to which the policy is
offensive (both across the board and as applied to particular
employees), the strength of the justification for a policy that does
invade privacy, and the question whether there are other ways that
the employer could achieve its legitimate goals with a lesser
infringement on the employee's autonomy. Antidiscrimination
law, by contrast, makes almost no effort to examine the
offensiveness of a policy and tends to do a poor job at allowing
nuance in the question of justification and fit because of the
concern that accepting too many things as a BFOQ will eviscerate
the prohibitions against discrimination.
Moreover, privacy law explicitly incorporates an analysis of
justification and narrow tailoring that antidiscrimination law does
only in part. When it comes to race, because there is no BFOQ for
race in Title VII, in theory there is no justification, no matter how
compelling, for an employer to discriminate. 54 As to other
protected traits, courts have tried (outside the context of
appearance codes and Hooters) to limit the circumstances in which
employer or customer preference counts as a BFOQ to a set of
narrow special categories. When the justification is asserted for a
form of disparate impact discrimination, as in the case of the duty
to accommodate religion, the law is far more forgiving of an
employer's choices that disparately burden people of one religion
over another. Neither in the case of BFOQ nor business necessity
have courts been as thoughtful as one might like about tying the
degree of harm to the strength of justification to the fit between the
justification and the policy that inflicts the harm. Privacy analysis,
at its best, insists that courts and lawyers think critically at all three
steps.
2. PrivacyforAll
Privacy analysis offers three additional advantages over
discrimination analysis. These three advantages stem from the fact
that a right of privacy flows from the employees' status as people,
not their status as members of a group. A right of privacy is a
protection for the dignity of all people, not merely those who can
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000). Many think there is an unwritten BFOQ
for race (police departments use race in assigning undercover cops, movie
makers use race in casting, and law firms use race in assigning lawyers to handle
a race-sensitive trial). See Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of
Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law and the New Significance of Race in
America, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 677, 680 (2004).
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link their desire to be free from workplace humiliation to their
membership in some legally protected group.
The first advantage of the universal availability of privacy
protection, as opposed to the group-based protection of
antidiscrimination law, is that privacy doctrine is the one place in
employment law where courts have recognized that there are
boundaries to the employer's ability to regulate the workplace in
ways that impinge on the employee's sense or expression of self.
Rather than focusing on equal as opposed to special treatment (is it
equality or discrimination to require all cadets at the Citadel to
shave their heads or all Air Force officers to wear no head covering
at certain times?), privacy focuses on the right of employees to
have a sphere, whether it is the contents of their desk, the content
of their thoughts, the contents of their weekend calendar, or the
style of their hair that is free from employer control absent a strong
justification.
Second, privacy helps address the conventional complaint that
only "favored" groups are protected by the law. As Kenji Yoshino
has pointed out, everyone has to do some things regarding their
appearance that they don't like--what he calls "covering"--in
order to put on the faqade that is expected in different work
settings. 5 While it is true that WASP men are protected under
Title VII too, and thus on the right facts a white man could sue to
challenge appearance regulation, there is a widespread perception
among whites that people of color, religious minorities, and
women have greater workplace protections because they get to
choose whether to acquiesce in a gender- or race-stereotyped dress
code or whether to fight it. A privacy theory is available to any
employee who can convince a court that some aspect of a dress
code is offensive to their authentic self.
Third, privacy law moves the focus away from
antidiscrimination law's emphasis on group membership,
immutable traits, and group exercise of fundamental rights and
toward the ways in which appearance regulation can harm people
because of their individuality rather than their group membership.
By putting the focus on autonomy and the limits on self-expression
at work, the law would extend to all employees a right to legal
protection for authentic expression as each person feels it.
Moreover, privacy analysis would turn the old antidiscrimination
analysis (which forced lawyers to argue for the immutability of
identity) on its head. It is the mutability of appearance and the
choices that each person makes about how to express themselves
55. Kenji Yoshino, Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights
(Random House 2006).
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through their appearance that make workplace dress worthy of
legal protection.
Not only does a privacy analysis avoid the fearsome specter of
the man "minc[ing] around in high heels, 56 it also captures an
element of dress regulation that is missing from the conventional
analysis. Considering appearance regulations from the standpoint
of antidiscrimination law misses a fundamental part of why
employers impose them, why employees find them objectionable,
and why the law should restrict it. Moreover, prohibiting only
those applications of dress codes that discriminate on the basis of a
protected status leaves vulnerable those employees who either do
not find or cannot prove that their objection to a dress code is
based on a protected identity characteristic. Conceiving them as
invasions of the autonomy that the right of privacy protects,
however, catches more of the nuance about when and why they
should be prohibited.
C. AnticipatingObjections
Let me now address a number of the objections one might
make to my proposal. First, there is the obvious but facile
criticism that a right of privacy seems a poor choice for protecting
something that is as quintessentially public as the public face we
set for the world. A right of privacy is a misnomer, at least in
some of its applications in both an employment relationship and
more obviously in constitutional discourse. It protects all sorts of
behavior that is not necessarily hidden from view; it protects a
boundary between the self and the world, or between one's
personal life and one's work life. As many have observed, privacy
should be about autonomy, rather than secrecy. Some versions of
the common law right of privacy protect public information, like a
photograph of your face, when the harm to your dignity or
autonomy comes not from revelation of private information but
from falsely associating
your identity with a product or portraying
57
you in a false light.

56. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1067 (7th
Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring) (complaining that case law on sex
stereotyping "has gone off the tracks" in reasoning "as if there were a federally
protected right for male workers to wear nail polish and dresses and speak in
falsetto and mince about in high heels, or for female ditch diggers to strip to the
waist in hot weather.").
57. Prosser, supra note 30, at 804-07 (discussing the appropriation, for
defendant's benefit, of the plaintiff's name or likeness), 812-14 (discussing false
light privacy).

1140

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

A more serious objection is that the employee's autonomy right
collides with the employer's autonomy right to put its face before
the world through the faces of its employees. This is a point
elegantly raised by Robert Post in his work on appearance and
discrimination, PrejudicialAppearances, when he commented on
an ordinance that was proposed (but not ultimately enacted in its
most vigorous form) that would have prevented employers from
discriminating based on employee appearance. 58 An advocate of
the ordinance described the discrimination she experienced
because employers felt threatened by a woman with a shaved head,
save for a single patch of bright pink hair, and a stripe tattooed on
her face. Post observed some inconsistency between the woman's
awareness and embrace of the shock conveyed by her appearance
and her belief that she should be free from adverse employment
action because of the reactions her looks elicit. He remarked on
"the seemingly paradoxical notion that persons have the right both
to use their appearance to communicate meanings, including
messages of 'threat,' and simultaneously expect others to ignore
these messages." 59 A resolution of the paradox, if there is a
paradox, can be reached if we use law to force people to confront
exactly what meaning is conveyed by a sales clerk with a shaved
head, a lawyer with blue hair, or a cross-dressing insurance agent.
There are two parts to the analysis. First, there is the idea that
finns have a right to express themselves through their employee's
appearance. The heart of the opposition to appearance regulation
is the idea that it deprives the employer of its autonomy right to
express itself through the faces of the people it hires. I question
whether employers, even when they are individuals, and even
when the job in question has an important component of conveying
certain values, have a right to express themselves through their
employees regardless of the message. Take the extreme case of
employer autonomy: where I am hiring a nanny to care for my
children. Why should I be able to require her to wear a uniform, if
the message conveyed by domestic staff wearing a uniform is one
of subordination (as I think it is)? Why should the owner of a spa
60
be able to require "badly coiffed employees" to get their hair cut?
What message is conveyed by an employee of a spa having a hair
cut that the spa owner does not like?

58. Post, supra note 13, at 2-7; Robert C. Post, K. Anthony Appiah, Judith
Butler, Thomas C. Grey & Reva B. Siegel, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic
of American Antidiscrimination Law 15 (Duke Univ. Press 2001).
59. Post, supra note 13, at 5.
60. Jesella, supranote 22, at 130.
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I used to get my hair cut by a large woman who variously wore
her head nearly shaved, or her hair (when she had any) dyed bright
unnatural colors. That I did not share her preferences for her own
hair said nothing about whether she could competently give me
conventional and attractive haircuts by my standards. Her looks
did no more than invite me to make clear that my taste differed
from hers and to ask whether she was willing and able to give
haircuts much more conservative than her own.
Whatever the force of the employer autonomy argument when
the employer is an individual or a small business, in which case the
business can be seen to express the individuality of the person who
owns it, I question whether a corporation has a similar right.
Courts have been reluctant to extend to corporations the same
panoply of associational and expressive rights that individuals
enjoy, recognizing that the articulation of corporate expression or
association rights comes at the expense of employees' rights to be
free from discrimination. 6 1 Whose expression are we protecting?
The managers, executives, or stockholders of corporations? In
what sense do the shareholders of Harrah's casinos express
themselves through the bartender in Reno? The argument usually
gains traction only when it is taken to an extreme in one direction
or another. A fashion industry executive who suggested an
employee get a pedicure before wearing a pair of sandals to an
industry gala would defend her position by saying that, in the
fashion world, people are judged on their looks, and that even a
single employee whose feet might prompt someone else in the
industry to think the employee was unattractive
could somehow
62
adversely affect the reputation of the firm.
Even if you assert that corporations should have a right of
expression in this context, as they have a right to engage in first
amendment speech,63 one might still question whether a
corporation's right to express itself through employee appearance
is sufficiently compelling to trump an employee's right to express
herself. In the first amendment context, the expressive interests of
associations is generally limited to those associations-whose
ranks may have grown after the Supreme Court upheld the right of
the Boy Scouts to express a homophobic message by the exclusion
61. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S. Ct.
3244 (1984) (Jaycees organization has no right to exclude women from
membership); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000)
(Boy Scouts have expressive right to exclude gays).
62. Jesella, supra note 22, at 130.
63. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S. Ct. 1407 (1978)
(statute that prohibits corporations from expending funds to influence the vote
on ballot measures violates the first amendment).
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of gays64-that can credibly claim to be sufficiently private and
sufficiently devoted to expression that it would violate the rights of
the members to join together with those who share their views and
to exclude those who do not. It is a huge leap to move from a
private organization's expressive interests in excluding gays to the
right of large corporations to express themselves in their hiring
decisions.
But if you make that move, of course, all of
contemporary
antidiscrimination law becomes constitutionally
65
suspect.
Second, even if you accept the notion that firms have some
legally protectable right to express themselves through their
employees' appearance, you have to ask what message is conveyed
by a firm that employs a person with an appearance which may be
unconventional or, to some, even shocking? Consider tattoos and
headscarves as examples.
Tattoos. The meaning of tattoos appears to be undergoing a
significant transition in the contemporary United States. Once
considered the favored adornment of sailors of the lowest rank, and
later regarded the insignia of renegade motorcyclists and gang
members, tattoos are now said to be widely accepted among the
younger generation. A 2003 Harris online interactive poll, as
reported in a Nevada newspaper, found that thirty-six percent of
people between the ages of twenty-five and twenty-nine have at
66
least one tattoo, as compared to a quarter of those in their thirties.
The news article portrayed the perception of tattoos as being very
generationally specific: younger people think nothing of them;
older people find them slovenly, repulsive, or even intimidating. If
the justification for allowing employers to prohibit tattoos is
customer reaction (though it is not always that; some even argue
that employers can inquire about and refuse to hire based on
tattoos that are not visible when the employee is clothed),67 what
weight should we give to the possibility that the employer is
misjudging customer reaction? The growing popularity of tattoos
suggests that their meaning is changing. The employer's message
in banning them may be muddier than it once was, which should
reduce the weight of whatever interest the employer has in
regulating that aspect of employee self-expression. If tattoos are
no longer a reliable predictor of a bad attitude towards authority or
64. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
65. Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Perspectives on
Constitutional Exemptions to Civil Rights Laws: Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale: The Expressive Interests of Associations,9 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 595

(2001).
66.
67.

Dela Vega, supranote 29, at 1E.
Id.
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towards work, it is hard to imagine any legitimate employer
interest in refusing to hire employees with tattoos that are not
visible while the employee is clothed. Moreover, if the younger
generation is capable of dissociating tattoos and bad behavior,
should not the law force the older generation to abandon its
stereotypes?
Headscarves. The furor over French legislation banning
headscarves in schools raised the question whether the ban was
about preserving a secular society, protecting girls against
repressive religious demands, or oppressing Muslim identity. A
careful student of the debate over the legislation could find a mix
of these motives in the ban.68 The wearing of the headscarf itself
could reflect the wearer's attempt to convey one or more of
multiple messages, including religious piety, gender subordination,
or ethnic pride. You could see in the Muslim women who insist on
headscarves a desire to embrace an ethnic heritage or pride that
becomes all the more fierce as they perceive a rising tide of antiimmigrant sentiment among non-Muslim French. You could see a
desire to find the comfort of ethnic identity as an antidote to the
alienation and anomie of persistent poverty in the grim housing
projects outside Paris. And of course the interpretation of the
headscarf by viewers could vary as well. What some French may
once have deemed a relatively innocuous or charming ethnic or
religious tradition might now regard it as an endorsement of
separatism, chauvinism, or even anti-European violence. In short,
you cannot understand the multiple messages both implied by
women who wear headscarves and inferred by people who view
them without understanding the social and political context of the
Muslim and African immigrant population in France.
But the fact that you need to understand the context of group
identity in order to grasp the multiple meanings of certain habits of
dress does not mean that they would become unintelligible if we
supplemented the dominant antidiscrimination analysis with a
privacy analysis. My point, rather, is that we will need some
understanding of the group-based identity formation that people
engage in when they make choices about their appearance in order
to understand why some appearance regulations are permissible
and others are not. The messages conveyed by habits of dress and
personal adornment are varied, extremely context specific, and
change rapidly. The wearer, the employer, and the customer may
be conveying and receiving quite different messages. Awareness
68. John Valery White, Globalism and the American Civil Rights Model:
Toward an Assimilation Law, in Proceedings of the XVII Colloquio Biennale,
Associazione Italiana di Diritto Comparato (forthcoming 2006).
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of the group-based identity formation that dress performs and an
awareness of the equality issues implicated in appearance
regulation strengthens rather than weakens the claim for privacy
protection. In particular, given the muddiness in the signal, but the
undeniable hardship on an employee who is fired or not hired
because of her appearance, it seems to me that the employer's
argument for self-expression through employees' bodies is weaker
than the employees' arguments.
Another objection to my proposal goes to the question whether,
if we divorce the legal analysis of appearance regulation from
antidiscrimination analysis, we will lose our understanding of why
appearance regulation matters. Every observer of appearance
regulation, at least since Erving Goffman's influential (and newly
resurgent) book Stigma, has noted that appearances are meaningful
because they enable both the viewer and the viewed to establish a
social identity by association with a category. Today's favorite
citation for that same observation is Malcolm Gladwell's
bestselling work, Blink, which documents the importance of snap
judgments formed on first impressions. 69 That is, appearances
identify us as members of a group, and they are meaningful only in
the context of particular cultures. A headscarf can be religious (on
a nun or a Muslim woman), ethnic (on a person expressing
Caribbean identity or heritage), or glamorous (on a Hollywood
movie star riding in a convertible in the 1950s). Lots of gold
jewelry can be "ghetto fabulous" on a black person, 70 or a
traditional display of wealth and status in India, or glamorous on
the wife of a Texas oil magnate shopping in Beverly Hills, or
trashy among certain New England old money sorts who disdain
conspicuous displays of wealth. The importance of appearance as
an expression of self is meaningful only in the context in which
appearance says something about you (or at least you think it
does), and that has necessarily something to do with group identity.

69. Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking
(Time Warner Book Group 2005). See Jesella, supra note 22, at 130 (companies
have appearance guidelines because of the power of first impressions, citing
Gladwell for the proposition that we make our most important decisions based

on first impressions).
70.

Michael Specter, I Am Fashion: Guess Who Puff Daddy Wants to Be?,

The New Yorker, Sept. 9, 2002, at 117. To attend a fashion show in Paris, Puff
Daddy "would have to look, in the phrase coined by Andre Harrell, his former
boss at Uptown Records, 'ghetto fabulous.' That meant choosing appropriate
accessories: a silver tie, smoke-colored sunglasses, diamond-and-platinum
earrings, a bracelet or two, a couple of diamond rings the size of cherry
tomatoes, and a watch covered with jewels and worth nearly a million dollars."
Id.
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I think that reconceiving workplace appearance regulation in
terms of privacy will not sacrifice the group identity based
understanding of why appearances matter and why protecting
employees' rights to choose their appearance is important in the
ongoing project of eliminating racial, gender, and other forms of
subordination. It will strengthen the project by forcing us to
recognize that appearance rules that do not discriminate on the
basis of a protected class, like tattoos or green hair, nevertheless
subordinate an out group and do so in a way that is often
unjustified by business necessity and based largely on illIt turns out, as a Nevada employer
considered stereotype.
remarked, that "[y]ounger folks are into body art, and have a good
work ethic."
IV.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that we should reconceive the legality of
workplace dress codes in terms of the universal protections for
liberty and autonomy that are protected by the right of privacy
rather than, as we have done, through group-based equality
doctrine. My proposal does not require a break with past law but
rather simply a shift in emphasis. That is, using the formulation of
appearance
Ramachandran-that
and
Gulati,
Carbado,
requirements are "a kind of forced assimilation into gender
normative behavior"-I simply suggest we focus more than we
have on the forced assimilation part as opposed to the gender
normativity part.
A casual reader of the legal literature on appearance regulation
might come away with the vague impression either that people
who write on the topic are especially literary in their tastes or that
there is some deep connection between novels and the law of
appearances. The truth of the matter is that novelists have, because
of the constraints of their task, learned something that lawyers
have not: appearances matter because of what they reveal about
interiors. A lawyer or judge arguing that workplace appearance
regulation is inoffensive or trivial operates from that old notion
(especially popular with parents trying to console an adolescent
insecure about his or her looks or to counsel someone making an
unwise choice in love) that looks are only skin deep. A novelist
would never say that; the description of a character's appearance in
a novel is rarely just about the surface; it is about revelation of a
character's personality, history, motivations, and future.
71.

Dela Vega, supra note 29, at 1E.
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So too in life. The way people choose to dress and other
aspects of their appearance are deliberate choices for most people.
Those who dress to blend into a Wall Street culture do so because
that is how they see, or feel, themselves in the world. Those who
choose to dye their hair green do so because they want to be
noticed by those without green hair (and to blend in among the
green hair crowd). The way we choose to dress, and it is always an
ongoing process of choice, is part of everyone's process of selfdefinition. Whatever someone's choice, to require him or her to
dress in a way that feels fundamentally contrary to his or her
preferences is to ask him or her to project an inauthentic self.
Regardless of whether you can identify your self-definition with a
group currently protected under antidiscrimination law, the right to
define your self is at the very core of what the right of privacy
should protect.

